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Thirty years have now gone by since Chile launched the first modern large-scale 
private participation in infrastructure (PPI) program in a developing country as part of a larger 
scale privatization policy. It took more than another 15 years to see the experience replicated 
on a similar scale in another country with Argentina’s infrastructure reforms launched in 1989 
by the Menem administration. At about the same time, some of the most economically 
aggressive East Asian countries started to rely on creative project finance for many of their 
large infrastructure projects. Within 20 years of Chile’s daring policy experience, it seemed 
that all developing countries from the poorest countries of Africa to the richest countries of 
East Asia were at least flirting with the idea of PPI and often wed to it. Between 1984 and 
2003, PPI generated investment commitments of about US$790 billion. 
After reaching a peak of US$131 billion in 1997, PPI commitments have however 
steadily dropped and reached less than US$50 billion in 2003.
1 This is a strong indication that 
many of the relationships have gone sour.  In fact, as seen in many experiences in Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, Asia or Africa, the new millennium seems to bring a high rate of 
request for separation or divorce from this policy. For Latin America for instance, Guasch 
(2004) shows that roughly 50% of the concession contracts signed since the mid 1980s ended 
up being renegotiated. It thus seems useful to try to take stock of what is going wrong with the 
infrastructure “couples” that were in the limelight of the 1990s to get a sense of what may 
have triggered the increasing demands for divorce on both sides of the relationship  and to 
assess what can be salvaged and what needs to be fixed.  
As always when it comes to divorces, the story is more complex than it seems. Facts 
tend to be ignored, reinterpreted or rewritten by each partner in the couple and each one gets a 
wagon of supporters and detractors who tend to be happy to help rewrite history in favor of 
the side they want to support. Facilitating the subjective and emotional positioning of 
observers are the many gaps in the common knowledge of crucial basic facts. Indeed, many of 
the facts are actually unknown simply because many of the fights and “peace treaties” made 
within the couple are not shared with the outsiders—e.g. who knows about the side deals 
between governments and private operators or even between host governments and the 
government of origin of the operators? who knows about the deals between governments and 
the unions?.  
Recognizing that there are common knowledge gaps, this paper tries to provide a fair 
overview of basic documented facts which could explain why the rejection of PPI seems to be 
increasing in many countries while at the same time, new marriages still generated close to 
US$50 billion in 2003. The main focus of the paper is on the various dimensions of the 
distributional effects of PPI. The paper draws a lot on my direct personal experiences and 
research as a witness of reforms and crisis in PPI in a large number of developing countries 
and does probably not do justice to a lot of the ongoing research in the field. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the historical context that 
eased the initial flirting of many governments with PPI. Section 3 gives a sense of the actual 
                                                 
1 The data is from the World Bank PPI database.   2
degree to which flirts with PPI have resulted in weddings. Section 4 reviews the many hopes 
that  PPI had generated. Section 5 summarizes the extent to which the hopes have been made 
reality. Section  6 shows that PPI was not simply about the relationship between the 
government and the private infrastructure operators but that many more actors were involved. 
It also shows that the large heterogeneity across sectors and regions matters to the 
determination of winners and losers in terms of PPI.  Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Remembering the initial conditions 
 
To figure out who wants a partnership and who wants a divorce between the public 
and the private sector in infrastructure, it is useful to get a sense of who the winners and losers 
of reforms are. This, in turn, requires some historical baseline from which changes resulting 
from reform can be compared and their consistency with the promises made assessed.  
In this section, I first propose to provide as a baseline a snapshot of the situation at the 
time at which PPI became attractive to many governments. This baseline takes place around 
the mid-1980s. Many voters had become tired of the increasing rationing of many essential 
public services resulting from a long succession of fiscal crisis. These crisis had slowed down 
the cash flows needed to operate and maintain the public enterprises and clearly reduced the 
opportunities to increase access rates at higher rates than population growth. Quality was a 
also a source of frustration for many users. Indeed, poor service quality and service 
deterioration were the norm in many of the countries (WDR 1994).  
At the time, for many countries, sector reforms, including public-private partnerships 
in infrastructure (PPPI), were seen as a way out of an apparently inescapable downward 
spiral. PPI was expected to reduce power outages, speed up phone connections, improve the 
quality of water, and increase the safety of transportation systems among many other things. 
PPI then seemed as a good alternative to a long history of public sector failures. 
If access and quality were obvious problems, it is probably fair to say that average 
tariff levels were quite acceptable to users, in particular residential, with access to the services 
(except probably for telecoms services). Indeed, effective tariff levels (taking into account 
large shares of unpaid bills) appeared to be low while,  power outages and water shortages 
were the expected norm in many regions of these countries.  
The reverse of the low tariff medal was low levels of cost recovery and the resulting 
fiscal costs. The taxpayers were covering the gaps between average costs and average 
effective tariffs. Subsidy levels were quite significant in most infrastructure sectors.  Most 
users did not realize or care that the subsidies were also quite regressive. One of the first well 
documented case is Colombia. Velez (1996) shows that in 1992 found that  80% of the 1.4% 
of GNP spent on subsidies for utility services benefited mostly middle income households. 
For Latin America,  studies have shown that as much as 60-80 percent of the historical cross-
subsidies have gone to households well above the poverty threshold, while as many as 80 
percent of poor households failed to benefit.
2 In other words, it was unlikely that the middle 
class would have been too enthusiastic for reform if quality had been reasonable. 
                                                 
2 For a review of these studies, see Estache, Foster and Wodon (2002)   3
Until quality became a real issue for the middle and upper income classes, the most 
vocal unhappy user group tended to be the non-residential users. Not only did they not get the 
quality they needed to be competitive but in addition they were often subject to higher 
average and marginal tariff rates than residential users. Indeed, cross subsidies tended to be 
common—favoring mostly the middle class rather than the poor-- and generated significant 
economic inefficiencies since average tariff levels were increasing with decreasing production 
costs.  
The poorest segment of the population were also quite unhappy because they were 
largely excluded from the delivery of public services by public enterprises, relying instead on 
alternative (often high costs) small and medium private providers. However,  they had, and 
still have, little political clout. In a forthcoming study of the evolution of public service 
delivery in Africa, Estache (2004), reviewing the evidence,  shows that for a large sample of 
African countries, the bottom two deciles of the population are essentially not connected and 
rely on alternative sources of energy and water. In other words, unless the reforms could 
generate affordable new access, the poor were not really concerned by the utility privatization 
wave. In fact, many were already dealing with private small scale providers in rural areas and 
secondary cities and there was no hope for a bigger public participation in the financing of 
their private provision.   
Individually the various unhappy groups had little leverage on policymakers. 
Overtime, however, the inclusion in the coalition of the supporters of reform of the middle 
class--unhappy with the deterioration of service or increasingly demanding—made the 
demands for reform viable. Collectively, although with very different motivations, a fairly 
wide accumulation of frustrations of these heterogeneous groups of interests managed to 
provide the political support needed for reforms. A 1995 UN financed survey suggested that 
about 75% of the Latin American population actually supported privatization policies then.
3 
The main residual vocal group against the reform were the public sector workers (and their 
families) who lost jobs, and often associated privileges. They were not too concerned either 
that their jobs were financed by taxes paid by the contemporary population, or bonds to be 
repaid by the following generation.  
To conclude this quick overview of the baseline situation, it may be useful to point out 
that all of these reforms were taking place in an environment in which the cost of private 
funds was at an historical low levels. Indeed, there was an unusually high excess supply of 
funds on the international capital markets favoring FDI and other forms of international of 
capital flows. This eased  PPPI in politically committed countries. The necessary commitment 
was in fact relatively easy to obtain because the 1990s also saw a wave of ideological changes 
favoring market oriented reforms among leaders of all political sides. Many of the leaders 
elected on left leaning platforms (e.g. Menem in Argentina, Cardozo in Brazil or Wade in 
Senegal) during the 1990s were in fact among the strongest supporters of these reforms.  
It may also be useful to point out that in almost all countries, privatization and 
infrastructure reforms were actually part of a wider reform agenda and that when some of the 
reforms did not work out as planned, many of the successful ones saw their effectiveness 
eroded.  For instance, Benitez et al. (2003) provide a test of the relative impact of PPPI and of 
financial markets reforms on the macroeconomic performance. They show for Argentina that 
                                                 
3 UN (1999)   4
credit market restrictions resulting from the failed banking reforms are a much more 
convincing explanation for the increase in unemployment observed since the East Asia crisis. 
The test suggests that PPPI was actually associated with increases in the jobs number after the 
initial adjustment, thereby questioning a standard myth associated with the costs of public 
service privatization.  
3. How widespread is PPPI now? 
Before reviewing the extent to which the reforms have delivered, it may be useful to 
say a few words about the extent to which the reforms have been implemented around the 
world, that is how many countries actually tried to depart from the baseline situation. Table 1 
provides a snapshot for 2002 of the extent to which private capital had actually become a 
significant source of financing of telecoms and energy. The most obvious observation is that 
private capital seems to be mostly attracted by rich countries. Among developing countries, 
Latin America clearly stands out--which explains why a lot of the evidence available on the 
impact of reforms tends to come from that region.  For the other regions, there seems to be a 
certain degree of “specialization” in PPI. East Asian countries have been major players in the 
electricity generation business with many IPPs signed over the years in roughly two thirds of 
the countries, nearly as high a share as in Latin America. For telecoms, it is Eastern Europe 
who is second to Latin America. The most surprising facts to many observers may be that  
PPI in electricity distribution has been much less common than often assumed by less 
quantitative assessments of privatization. 
 
Table 1: Countries with Private Capital as of 2002 (% of sample) 
Number of countries in sample  155  155  164 
 Electricity  Generation Electricity Distribution  Telecoms 
By Income Level:      
Low Income developing   33%  26%  37% 
Lower-Middle Income developing  39%  31%  51% 
Upper-Middle Income developing 58%  39%  66% 
High Income (Developed)  70%  43%  83% 
By World Bank-Region classification:      
Sub-Saharan Africa  33%  24%  41% 
East Asia and Pacific  60%  20%  38% 
Europe & Central Asia  41%  37%  58% 
Latin America & Caribbean  68%  57%  67% 
Middle East & North Africa  7%  6%  23% 
South Asia  38%  13%  50% 
High Income (Developed)  70%  43%  83% 
Total 46%  32%  55% 
Source: Author compilation from various sources 
  
This story is not unique to electricity and telecoms.  In transport, the road sector is the 
one in which the largest number of private sector deals have been signed. While there is no 
official statistics available, it is safe to argue that private capital has been concentrated on 
high traffic parts of the road system and that the public sector continues to be the main source 
of financing and often O&M for the rest of the network. Something similar could be argued   5
for the airport or port sectors where many countries have tried but few have succeeded outside 
of Latin America in getting the private sector to take over the business or at least part of it—
e.g. container handling, stevedoring or warehousing. As for railways, according to Jane’s 
World Railways (2004), as of 2003, out of the 131 countries with a railways system only 
about 25% have some type of private participation in major operations or management.
4 The 
variance is however high varying from over 50% of  African and Latin American countries to 
less than 5 % in Eastern Europe.
5  As for OECD countries, the usual differences between 
anglo-saxon and non anglo-saxon countries prevail, with the first group dominated by private 
operation while the public sector continues to run the trains in the second one.   
The assessment of the water sector is more complex. In many countries, this activity is 
often decentralized and municipalities have the main responsibility for its provision. 
Historically, large utilities have tended to concentrate on the needs of the largest cities—
cream skimming also takes place in the public sector-- and have left the local governments to 
address their needs and to find local solution with or without technical support from the 
national government. In that context, there is plenty of evidence that the private sector has 
been involved for quite long through small service contracts in rural areas and in secondary 
areas where public and private utilities, have often not managed or wanted to go.
6 As for its 
role in larger utilities, it is distributed between management contracts, affermages and 
concessions.  
Ultimately, the factual evidence suggests that the flirting with PPPI has led to fewer 
wedding bells than often argued or assumed. PPPI has worked for the higher income groups 
across sectors but even there, many governments have been reluctant to tie the knot. More 
troublesome is the fact that PPPI has been much less effective than often believed in the 
poorest LDCs. Only one in three or four countries of the poorest countries have been 
successful in getting the private sector interested in participating in the financing of the 
developments of their infrastructure needs. This means that for the vast majority of the 
countries the government has continued to be the main actor in the sector. Moreover, the 
unmet hope for more PPI has probably left a bigger financing gap than often appreciated.  
 
4. The promises of PPPI 
 
Many very diverse, often inconsistent, promises have been made in the context of 
reforms leading to PPPI. The most common ones can be summarized as follows: 
•  Contribution to fiscal stabilization 
•  Increased investments  
•  Improved efficiency from a more competitive environment 
•  Contribution to growth 
•  Better access and affordability for residential users 
•  Improved governance 
 
                                                 
4 Based on country specific descriptions  from Jane’ World Railways  Yearbook (2003-2004), available (for a 
fee!) at http://catalog.janes.com/catalog/public/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.ProductInfoBrief&product_id=115 
5 For a recent overview of progress in the transport sector,  see Estache and Serebrisky (2004)  
6 Collignon and Vezina (2000)   6
The relative importance of the expected outcomes is probably not necessarily in that order for 
all governments and stakeholders but this ranking is probably not too far off for many 
countries. 
The fiscal impact of the reform was indeed probably the main expected payoff of the 
reforms in many countries, at least in the short run. The gains were expected to come from 
three sources: (i) income from the sale, lease or rental of assets; (ii) the reductions in public 
sector operational and capital expenditures (OPEX and CAPEX) resulting from the transfer of 
responsibilities for the sectors to private operators and (iii) the net increased tax and non tax 
revenue. 
This last component has often been underestimated in policy discussions and yet it can 
be quite important. In many countries, infrastructure services add up to a fairly large share of 
the economy—typically 10-15% of GDP-- and any expansion in the “taxable” part thanks to 
its “privatization” is likely to make a difference if implemented with that concern in mind. To 
get a sense of the potential payoff in steady state—i.e. ignoring the one time payoff from the 
PPI transaction itself--consider the following estimation. Very roughly if the sector generated 
10% of GDP and 60 to 75% of this value added was public and largely non-taxed before the 
reforms, at an average corporate income tax rate of 33%, this could generate 2-2.5% of GDP 
in additional income from direct taxes. Just as important is the potential that can be derived 
from indirect taxation by all government levels. It is thus not too surprising to see the support 
for this kind of policy from Ministers of Finance and many of the donors.  
Clearly related is the investment payoff of the reforms. The reformers expected to 
transfer the responsibility for at least some CAPEX from the public to the private sector but 
additional investments in infrastructure were also expected to result. Investment needs had 
indeed grown quite significantly over time with population and economic growth while fiscal 
constraints and changes in political priorities had resulted in drops in public investment levels 
in comparison to historical levels. For instance, for the first decade of this new millennium, 
the approximate new investment needs vary from as high as 4.5% of GDP for low income 
countries to about 1-2% of GDP for high income developing countries. Adding maintenance 
requirements, total resources needed ranged from close to 10% for the poorest countries to 
around 3% in high middle income countries. The developing country total expenditure needs 
in the sector average around 7.5% of GDP and many hoped to see a large share of these needs 
to be financed by PPPI.
7 
There was also an expectation that improved competition and regulation in the sector 
would lead to significant efficiency gains in the sector and hence cost reductions which would 
contribute to reduce the financing gap in the sector. The most obvious indicator of this hope 
was the fairly wide adoption of incentive based regimes in the design of regulatory 
frameworks. In energy, water, telecoms or transport, price caps tended to be the most favored 
form of regulation adopted by reforming governments. The right incentives were expected to 
get operators to cut costs and not just by reducing employment. The private sector, freed from 
many of the political constrained imposed on public sector operators was expected to unleash 
improvements in  technological and technical efficiency and not just labor productivity. 
                                                 
7 For details on these estimates, see Briceno et al. (2004)   7
The promised increased investment and improvements in quality would also generate 
a better overall investment climate in the reforming economies. The business environment 
would improve for investors in the sector, making it easier for foreign companies to invest in 
the revival of infrastructure. Investment would also flow faster and better than before the 
reforms in sectors needing infrastructure to bloom.  This in turn was expected to make a 
difference in terms of growth prospects.  
There was also an implicit promise that the residential users would eventually benefit 
from the increased investment and the improvements in efficiency. The guarantee was built in 
the commitment to organize scheduled tariff revision as in the UK to make sure that on a 
regular basis the expected efficiency gains would be passed on to users in the form of lower 
average tariffs--this was one of the expected payoff of the commitment to the development of 
a strong regulatory capacity. As for the poorest, most reforming governments would simply 
make sure that they would impose universal service obligations (USO) to avoid possible 
exclusions from any segments of the population. There was however very little discussion or 
commitment made with respect to the financing of these USO.  
A final promise associated with PPPI was that the governance of the sector would 
improve. In practice this means that corruption would drop in the sector. Infrastructure had 
indeed been traditionally associated with high levels of corruption at the construction stage as 
well as at the consumption stage. More transparent processes, more accountability of the 
operators and of the governments were expected to be instrumental in reducing the problem. 
The introduction of competition where possible and of independent regulatory institutions 
would also contribute to the stability of the PPPI experiences.  
 
5. To what extent were the promises met? 
 
The assessment of the fiscal impact of the reforms is currently one of the most hotly 
debated topic among policymakers. There is indeed a debate on the extent to which the 
macroeconomic reforms are now rationing the infrastructure sectors—the fiscal space debate. 
The mere existence of this debate implies that the public sector is far from being a minor actor 
in the financing of the sector and suggests that the fiscal outcome of the reforms is not what it 
was expected to be. In assessing the fiscal impact of the reforms, it is fair and useful to 
distinguish between the short and the medium run effects. 
The anecdotal and more formal evidence available suggests that the short run payoffs 
have been quite significant.
8 As expected, in most countries, short run public savings have 
been the main outcome of reductions in the role of the public sector. To a large extent this is 
because infrastructure services were costing more in OPEX and CAPEX subsidies than it was 
generating in tax and non-tax revenue. Argentina’s railways system was costing over a billion 
dollar per year up to the early 1990s reforms. For most countries, this was a “no- brainer” 
which suited well the macroeconomic adjustment needs.
9  
                                                 
8  Ugaz and Waddams  Price (2003) or Nellis and Birdsall (2004) for instance for a wide range of experiences or 
Chong and Flores de Silanes (2004) for Latin America.   
9 Privatizing is not always the best choice from a fiscal viewpoint. In the second half of the nineties, Uruguay 
was one of the countries in which from a strict short term macroeconomic fiscal viewpoint, the optimal policy 
was not to privatize simply because the revenue generated by the sector was quite significant.    8
The longer run story is however much more subtle and is at the core of the current 
debate. In many regions, the concern for affordability of public services is currently so clearly 
at the top of the politicians’ priorities that subsidies for both OPEX and CAPEX tend to last 
longer than the macroeconomic situation would require or tend to crawl back over time. In 
Eastern Europe for instance, by the end of the 1990s,  average cost recovery in the electricity 
sector was 63%. Between 2000 and 2002, it improved to 68%, due to an average price 
increase of 16% across the region. But the combination of high losses, non-payment of bills, 
and below-cost recovery tariffs added up to a fiscal cost of, on average, 7.5% of GDP at the 
end of the 1990s. It had dropped to 5.9% by end of 2002 through improvements in cost 
recovery but it remains high.
 10  
 Even for regions where the reforms had included major tariff rebalancing and initial 
subsidy cuts to ensure increase sector autonomy in a fiscally sound environment, the public 
sector eventually returned to the subsidization of the sectors. According to a recent study of 
the Latin American experience (Campos et al. (2003)), in that region, the long run effect of 
reforms is different for utilities and for transport. Utilities’ (energy and water and sanitation) 
privatization tended to be associated with no statistically significant increase in the 
contemporaneous GDP/capita or contemporaneous gross domestic investment, but tended to 
be statistically significant associated in the long run with increases in public investment and 
decreases in recurrent public expenditures. They also find in the long run an increase in the 
fiscal deficit in comparison with the level obtained from the initial impact of the reform. This 
implies that all the additional revenue from additional taxes introduced by all government in 
many countries to recapture some of the efficiency gains achieved by operators have not been 
enough to offset the additional subsidies requirements. For Transport, they find a statistically 
significant increase in contemporaneous GDP/capita but no effect on gross domestic 
investment. As for the fiscal effect, they find the exact opposite to what they found for 
utilities. In the long run, increased PPI in transport is associated with a statistically significant 
decline in public investment and a statistically significant increase in recurrent public 
expenditures. It is also associated with a statistically significant decrease in the 
contemporaneous deficit. 
While these results are clearly specific to this region, they provide more general 
insights. Transport privatization usually takes place in a much more competitive environment. 
The public sector exits and the private sector decides what’s in and what’s out. Intermodal 
competition is such that many services are often cancelled and inefficient providers exit the 
market. Small ports and many train stations or services are closed and that’s that. The only 
major problem the public sector has had is the need to increase operational subsidies to 
passenger rail when governments have not been willing to increase tariffs as agreed upon 
contractually. Often also, governments have ended up subsidizing freight railways to 
compensate for their inability to avoid predatory competition from the trucking industry. 
 In water and energy, the public sector has generally not left it to the private sector to 
decide the extent to which a service is provided or not. The markets failures are much more 
brutal and service obligations crucial. The public sector is the provider of last resort for 
services viewed by most as essential needs. The Latin American experience suggests that 
cream-skimming has been important in utilities. The long run fiscal consequences for the 
sector are the result of two factors: (i) the elimination of the cross-regional cross subsidies 
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resulting from cream-skimming for both OPEX and CAPEX and (ii) the high rate of 
renegotiation in the water sector which has resulted in effective increases in subsidies to 
CAPEX also in the cream of the business. 
The impact of reforms on investment has at least two dimensions that deserve a closer 
look.
11 The first is the impact on the total level of access to the population and to the non-
residential users. The second is the fiscal cost of these increases. On the first point, the 
evidence suggests quite strongly that the introduction of competition and effective regulation 
have generated increases in access rates in most sectors in most regions. The evidence is 
stronger for telecoms than for water and sanitation while the energy sector is in-between. The 
evidence on the impact of privatization is more ambiguous and certainly much more of a 
source of conflict and depending on the specification of the models tested.
12 Of particular 
interest is the finding by Wallsten (2004) on the telecoms sector. He shows that establishing 
the regulatory agency before PPI has a higher payoff than doing it simultaneously.  
On who pays for the investments, the story is somewhat less positive. In the early 
1990s, some optimists were forecasting that the private sector would be the main source of 
financing of the sectors. In retrospect, the increase in private sector participation is not trivial 
but PPI is not the main source of financing in the sector. The US$790 billion committed—not 
spent…—between 1984 and 2003 represents roughly 22% of the investments in 
infrastructure—70% is public sector and 8% ODA.
13 Moreover, as indicated in the 
introduction, the flows of private cash have declined since the 1997 East Asia crisis. The fact 
that Campos et al. (2003) show that the high renegotiations rates documented by Guasch 
(2004) have been such that Latin American governments have had to increase the support to 
CAPEX to some industries adds to the sense that the investment story is not as positive as it 
was made to be 15 years ago.   
  The effectiveness in meeting the efficiency gains is a less controversial topic. 
Although there is a tremendous amount of heterogeneity on the academic market as to who 
the impact of reforms can be measured. Some authors (e.g. Chong and Flores de Silanes 
(2003)) tend to focus on more financial or partial indicators (sales, profits, technical or service 
quality, labor productivity …), others (see Coelli et al. (2002 ) for a survey) tend to focus on 
the effects of reforms on various efficiency types (allocative, technical, technological). Others 
yet have been working on the welfare changes though partial indicators or general equilibrium 
models (see Estache, Foster and Wodon (2002) for a survey on these approaches). Whatever 
the approach, the overall message is usually quite positive for electricity, telecoms and most 
transport privatizations. There are more doubts on water privatization with a wide variety of 
experiences (for instance, see Estache and Rossi (2002)). Most of these papers however tend 
to focus on the ownership question. A few papers have now started to look at the impact of 
regulation on these efficiency measures. For developing countries, Estache and Rossi (2004a) 
show how the choice between price caps and rate of return matters as expected for efficiency 
and much more so than ownership in electricity distribution. 
                                                 
11 This discussion ignores the essential link of investment decisions with the cost of capital. Estache and Pinglo 
(2004) show that this cost of capital is particularly high in low income countries, a fact that contributes to 
explain the low levels of investment in that country group. 
12 See for instance Wallsten (2004) for an overview of the experience in telecoms in developing countries.  See  
13 For the original assessment of the financing shares, see DFID (2002)   10
As for the impact on the investment climate and the associated growth effects, the 
evidence is also quite strong. The consultation of foreign and domestic investors organized in 
preparation of the 2004 World Bank World Development Report on the Investment Climate 
identifies lack of infrastructure as one of the main sources of disincentives to investment. But 
there are many more ways of looking at the problem. For instance, Easterly and Serven (2003) 
estimate for Latin America that inadequate investment in infrastructure during the 1990s 
reduced long-term growth by 1–3 percentage points, depending on the country. To get a sense 
of the potential payoff, it is useful to compare East Asia where the investment gap has been 
addressed more effectively (mostly through government financing) with the Latin America. 
Easterly and Serven (2003) argue that about one-third of the difference in output per worker 
between Latin America and East Asia is explained by differences in infrastructure investment 
policies. A similar story holds for Africa. Indeed, Ramirez and Esfahani (2000) find that if 
Africa had enjoyed growth rates in telecommunications and power generation infrastructure 
comparable to those in East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, its annual growth rate would have 
been 1.3 percentage points higher. 
With respect to the promise of improved affordability, the results are also mixed. In 
most countries, the initial tariff rebalancing was quite good from an efficiency viewpoint but 
was often quite regressive in many countries. The reformers did often not pay enough 
attention to the redesign of tariff structures and the efficiency gains were achieved at the cost 
of an increase in the burden imposed on the lowest income groups connected. Moreover few 
countries have already organized the much anticipated tariff revisions needed to pass though 
some of the efficiency gains to the users and few if any of the unscheduled tariff revisions 
organized in the context of contract renegotiations have managed to do so effectively. This is 
well documented for Latin America (Estache, Foster and Wodon (2001) or Ugaz and 
Waddams-Price (2003)) and there is increasing evidence that this was also an issue in the 
context of reforms in Africa (Estache (2004)) and to some extent in Eastern Europe (Estache 
and Gassner (2004)). The adjustment adopted by many countries has been the decision to 
continue or scale up the subsidies to large segments of the population. This in turn feeds back 
to the fiscal impact of the reforms. This is a clear major problem. From a more social 
viewpoint, the major issue is that many of the subsidies are still not that progressive. As 
mentioned earlier, historically subsidies have tended to favor the middle and upper income 
classes simply because they were connected and the real poor were not. In the poorest regions 
of the world, including countries which have reformed, this continues to be the case. Increases 
in access rates hardly keep up with population growth rates. 
The last promise of the reforms was the improvement in the governance structure of 
the sectors. This implied that countries would increase the independence of their regulators 
and that this, in turn, would allow a more effective regulation of the sector (i.e. it would speed 
up increases in access rates, reduce costs, improve cost recovery and quality)  and reduce the 
corruption levels of the sector.  On the first promise, there is cross sectoral information 
available. However, Table 2 shows that, for electricity and telecoms, many government have 
indeed created autonomous regulatory agencies, including governments which have, willingly 
or unwillingly, not opened up to private capital. In 53% and 60% of the countries, 
respectively for electricity distribution and telecoms, autonomous agencies have been created. 
There are 10 times as many countries with agencies in 2002 than there were in 1990. Of 
course, this does not mean that agencies are really independent, but the signal is in the right   11
direction.
14   But the signals are not the same across country types or across sectors. 
Developing countries and developed countries differ in their commitment to autonomous 
regulation across sectors. Developed countries seem to be much more committed to 
autonomous agencies for electricity while developing countries seem to be more committed to 
creating agencies in telecoms. This partially reflects the fact that many of the regulatory issues 
in telecoms can be dealt with by competition agencies which are common in developed 
countries but much less so in developing countries—as well as the fact that there were more 
telecoms deals than energy deals in LDCs during the period covered here. 
Table 2 also reveals major differences across regions within developing countries. 
Latin America is a strong believer in the creation of agencies in both sectors. Eastern Europe 
has a strong commitment for electricity but not for telecoms. Africa and South Asia actually 
lead the regions for telecoms although they lag for electricity. The most unexpected 
information provided by Table 2 may be the rather modest commitment by East Asian 
countries to the creation of autonomous agencies. Comparing Table 1 and 2 should make it 
clear that the creation of autonomous agencies is not a sufficient condition to attract private 
capital in either sector. There is however some partial evidence that for countries with a weak 
history of governance, it helps.
15    






By Income Level:    
Low Income LDCs  33%  65% 
Lower-Middle Income LDCs  50%  54% 
Upper-Middle Income LDCs  63%  67% 
Developed   88%  55% 
LDCs By Region:     
Sub-Saharan Africa  30%  75% 
East Asia and Pacific  36%  19% 
Europe & Central Asia  70%  59% 
Latin America & Caribbean  73%  73% 
Middle East & North Africa  7%  50% 
South Asia  25%  75% 
Total 53%  60% 
Source: Author compilation from various sources (ITU for telecoms and consultation with World Bank, IDB, ADB , EBRD 
and EEC economists for electricity) 
 
A second indicator is the extent to which corruption has declined with reforms in the 
sector. Here the story is not as positive. While there is no long term monitoring of corruption 
in this sector, there is partial information available from various recent surveys of perception 
by foreign investors summarized in the World Bank Governance database. The database 
shows that, between 1999 and 2002,  for the richest developing countries, corruption has 
declined but extremely modestly (no change is rated at 4 on a scale of 1 to 7 and that country 
group was rated at 4.1). The other two country groups (low middle and low income LDCs) 
have seen corruption increase (the rating is 3.3 and 3.7 respectively).  Of course, these are 
                                                 
14 See for example Stern and Holder (1999) and Stern, J. and J. Cubbin (2003) 
15 See for instance  the recent book by Kessides (2004) for an overview of the debate.   12
very subjective results and they need to be complemented by a more formal analysis of the 
interactions between corruption and the reforms, including the creation of autonomous 
regulatory institutions in each sector and  privatization. 
For instance, Estache, Goicoechea an Manacorda (2004) show for the telecoms sector 
that:  (i) both privatization and the existence of an independent regulatory agency (IRA) tend 
to be associated with higher access rates and the effect of privatization is stronger than the 
effect of regulation but there is no significant differences across income groups of this 
impact;
16 (ii) in terms of the effect on prices, the existence of a regulatory agency has no 
significant effect in the lowest income group but it is associated with higher prices in middle 
and upper middle income developing countries—reflecting the usual tariff rebalancing that 
takes place with reform; (iii) there is no difference in the effects of privatization on prices 
associated with differences in income levels. Of direct relevance to the discussion here is first 
the observation that the existence of an IRA and privatization both reduce the effects of 
corruption and investment risks on access but there is no effect of the interaction with 
government stability. With respect to prices, the existence of an agency increases the increase 
in prices associated with investment risk but offsets the impact of government instability. 
Corruption and investment risks reduce the gains from privatization in terms of access while 
they somewhat reduce the price increases that result from privatization. The regression yields 
other interesting results on the role of corruption and other environmental variables in the 
sector but they go beyond the scope of this paper.  
The main overall conclusion is that the record is quite mixed. While in general, the 
efficiency levels, quality and access rates have benefited from the reforms, these gains have 
been achieved at significantly higher fiscal costs and distributional costs than expected. There 
are thus plausible reasons for tensions between governments, operators and users which may 
contribute to some of the divorces or at least some of the questioning of the relationships. 
Indeed, the PPPI relationship meets the expectations of the sector specialists concern with 
efficiency but probably not the standards of macroeconomists concern with the fiscal costs of 
the sector and with the interest groups committed to ensure that the interests of the poor are at 
the top of the short run agenda and not just on the long run agenda.  
 
6. So… who wants a wedding and who wants a divorce? 
 
   Section 5 showed the appropriate assessment of what works and what doesn’t in the 
PPPI couple is a multidimensional problem. This is likely to be strongly correlated with the 
winners and the losers of reform. This problem may be looked at from three main viewpoints. 
At the more global level, it is useful to check the extent to which the levels and factors of 
success of PPPI vary across regions or country types and the extent to which they vary across 
sectors.    
  Table 3 provides a snapshot of how much each region has received in terms of private 
sector commitments in infrastructure. It shows the total level, the number of projects and the 
investment commitment per capita for the period 1984-2002. Latin America is clearly the 
                                                 
16 This is in contrast to what Wallsten (1999) finds. His model covering the 1984-1997 period (i.e. pre East Asia 
crisis) finds that Privatization alone was associated with few benefits but combined with IRA made an impact. 
He also had a competition variable which was strongly correlated with access rates.   13
winner of the global flirting with PPI during the 1990s. It leads in all categories. Particularly 
impressive is the per capita figure. East Asia has done quite well in terms of total investment 
levels and number of projects but per capita, the numbers are clearly not as impressive. As 
expected, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, the two globally poorest regions have been the 
main losers. Although the Middle East appears to be at the bottom of the distribution of the 
investment payoffs of reform, its  per capita payoff is twice as large as for Africa and two an a 
half times larger than for South Asia. Eastern Europe has done somewhat surprisingly well 
per capita. 
Table 3: Selected Indicators of Regional distribution of PPPI 





Average Project Size 
(in US$ million) 
Accumulated Investment 
commitment per capita as of 
2002 (in US$) 
East Asia  182  687  265  99 
Eastern Europe  100  589  169  211 
Latin & Central 
America 
368 978  376  694 
Middle East  24  64  312  79 
South Asia  42  195  213  29 
Sub-Saharan Africa  26  213  122  38 
Total 741  2726  272  141 
Source: Author Calculations from World Bank PPI database and World Development Indicators 
  Looking at sectors the story of the winners and losers is also quite clear as can be seen 
from Table 4. In terms of investment commitments and average project size, the telecoms 
sector is the clear winner of the PPPI experience so far. In terms of the number of projects, 
however, telecoms lag both the energy and the transport sector. The clear loser of the 
experience is the water and sewerage sector. Things did not work out as planned. Its 
investment figures are very significantly lower than for any other sector. It represents only 5% 
of the total investment commitments generated between 1984 and 2002, in spite of the huge 
needs identified in the context of the Millenium Development Goals debate. 
 
Table 4: Sectoral Distribution of PPPI (1984-2002) 
  Energy  Telecoms  Transport  Water and 
Sewerage 
Total 
Total Investment Levels 
(US$ billion) 
242 332 129  39  741 
Total Number of Projects  1071  680  730  245  2726 
Average Project Size 
(US$ million) 
226 448 176 159 272 
Source: Author Calculations from World Bank PPI database 
 
  The most interesting assessment may be in terms of the payoffs to the actors.  The list 
of actors in the PPI game is relatively long and longer than recognized by casual observers. 
Most typically looked at are the users, the taxpayers, the workers and the operators. It is 
however useful to add the bankers, one of the driving forces behind most of the transactions. 
It is also useful to isolate the owners from the operators and within that group to distinguish 
between foreign and local owners. In view of their importance in the decision to reform and in   14
the implementation of the reforms, it would be unwise to ignore the role of politicians. For a 
similar reason, it is useful to look at the role of donors in the effectiveness of the PPPI 
experience. 
  Starting with the users, the overall story is probably globally positive in the long run at 
least. Access rates and quality have improved but many services may be less affordable than 
they use to be because of tariff rebalancing and improved costs recovery rates. In many 
countries this has had unhappy distributional implications which have largely contributed to 
the dislike of the PPPI experience.  For the poorest of the poor, the story is really a longer run 
story, the speed at which access rates have improved has been such that many have not yet 
been included in the investment plans of the utilities. The imposition of universal service 
obligation will eventually payoff but it may take a while. Moreover, cream-skimming in the 
design of reforms has often left rural and suburban areas out of the service obligations. In 
other words, these are at best indifferent to the reforms and at worse irritated because they feel 
excluded.  This is why in so many countries alternative institutional arrangements are 
emerging. The initial successes of rural energy and water programs look very promising for 
many of the poor users indeed.   
  The taxpayers should have been happy in the short run, assuming that the fiscal 
consequences of the reforms are clear to them—and this may be a strong assumption in view 
of the poor marketing of the reforms. The short run fiscal payoff has indeed been in general 
positive. However, the high renegotiation rates have revealed many problems. Taxpayers are  
increasingly hurt since they often end up being pulled back in the sector to support PPPI. This 
is contributing in a non-trivial way to the reform fatigue observed in Latin America and 
Africa at least. 
   The workers have generally lost in the short run since many of the reformed public 
enterprises used to be overstaffed. Unions are thus very likely to be vocal against PPPI. The 
longer run evidence is however more complex again. Chong and Lopez de Silanes (2003) 
show that, for a large range of experiences (including infrastructure but covering many more 
sectors), accounting for the increased long run demand that results from lower costs, 
employment increased in the reformed sectors within a few years.  
  The operators are quite a hybrid group. They can be highly specialized as in energy, 
railways or telecoms or they may be made of teams of specialists combining construction 
specialist for heavy works and sector specialist operators as in water and roads. They can be 
local, foreigner or a combination of both. The evidence suggests that in the long run, they are 
fine with PPPI if the rate of return on their operations is higher than the cost of capital they 
are facing.  
For many operators, PPI  has been a challenge since the East Asia crisis, particularly 
for foreign operators (see Estache and Pinglo (2004). But many of the operators, in the short 
run, making enough cash to cover operational expenditures, and ideally the short term debt 
service obligation, tends to be enough.  This was of course easier for local operators who pay 
dividends in local currency and it was easier for operator with low leveraging in foreign 
currency since they do not have to deal with debt service in hard currency. The fact that so 
many of the foreign operators stayed in the main East Asian countries after the 1997 crisis and 
that so few of the foreign operators have actually left Argentina since 2002 serve as evidence 
to this short term view of the interests. The road sector also reveals that the interests of the   15
different partners can differ quite quickly. The road sector is one of the sectors with the 
highest renegotiation rates (Guasch 2004) but in the process of renegotiation—which often 
took place after the biggest public works had been concluded--, there is a split in the position 
taken by the various members of consortia. The construction companies tend to pull out 
because they have already got what they wanted from the deal and the operating companies 
tend to stay because they have a long run interest in the business.  
The heterogeneity of operators explains their mixed messages on their assessment of 
the success of their partnerships with the public sector. Clearly, operators with dominating 
short term concerns and operators with little investment commitments and more of a 
management interest will tend to favor it. Those with long run concerns, including the need to 
slowly amortize heavy investments, are now much more likely to have cooled off to PPPI. For 
the operators interested in continuing the relationship, cream-skimming is likely to be much 
more common from now on. Operators will not pass on obviously great opportunities but it is 
likely to take a few years before the commitment levels recover in any significant way as risk 
aversion in the business seems to have increased significantly. As for salvaging the existing 
partnerships, renegotiations will lead to much lower risk levels internalized by operators and 
this means much less private investment associated with PPPI. Management contracts or 
similar arrangements are likely to become a much more common form of PPPI. Demand and 
costs uncertainty—in particular exchange rate risks--have become too tough to handle for 
foreign operators under most common regulatory arrangements. This has opened the door to 
the development of the local private and to an increase in the recognition of the small scale 
operators who have a long history of delivering where utilities did not deliver. PPPI will 
probably thus continue but not in the same form. 
  Of particular relevance to the future of PPPI are the actors who tend to stay more in 
the shadow. First there are the bankers. There role is generally underestimated in public 
debates on PPPI yet they are central actors and operators could not deliver much of their 
investment commitments with these bankers. Indeed, operators have basically three main 
financing options: equity, loans from national development banks at concessionary rates or 
commercial money—retained earnings will help in the long run but obviously not in the short 
run. The main financing problem for operators in LDCs is that they can only very seldom rely 
on local banks to provide long term financing—the longest term available tend to be 12-15 
months. They thus need to rely on international banks with the ability to “mimick” long run 
financing for investment in assets with economic life ranging from 20 to 50 years.
17 In other 
words, when an operator signs a 30 year contract, chances are that the bankers will become a 
crucial partner in the PPI relationship.  
What is less appreciated is that the bankers can benefit from the transaction whether 
the relationship is a happy one or an unhappy one. Indeed, when things go sour and a 
renegotiation is needed, as was the case in East Asia at the end of the 1990s or in Latin 
America more recently, the more active players are the financial advisors helping in the 
financial restructuring of the business. Every restructuring, just like any initial placement of 
bonds, has its plethora of transaction fees which are often much more profitable than any 
                                                 
17 For large international groups such as the large energy or water companies, it is relatively easy to borrow on 
international markets for the long run which is one of the underestimated payoff of PPI but for smaller operators 
and clearly for small local operators, borrowing to do business is much more complex.   16
lending activity per se for these companies. It is thus natural to expect that this group of actors 
will tend to be in favor of a long lasting PPPI and will be there, rain or shine. 
  The second group in the shadow, but increasingly often in the limelight, is the group 
made of the official and unofficial donors. International aid agencies have indeed been key 
players in these reforms as well, both as advisors in their implementation and often also as 
financiers of the restructuring needed to facilitate these transactions.  It turns our that this is 
also a fairly heterogeneous group. The multilateral international organizations have generally 
been seen as strong supporters of the relationship and often been blamed or credited—
depending on where you stand-- for being its promoter. The bilateral aid agencies have 
probably been just as supportive of the relationship—simply look at their websites to get a 
sense of their position--  but have attracted much less attention. This is to some extent because 
in many countries, their job is often to support the international transactions of national 
operators. Then there are the NGOs. They can be considered as unofficial donors and are 
increasingly becoming a player in the public debate. Their position is often much more critical 
of PPPI.   
  The final players deserving an explicit recognition in the debate on whether there is a 
PPPI or a PPDI are the politicians. Ideology changes and the wheel of “ownership 
preferences” seems to have now done a full turn since it was launched in the late-1980s. The 
withdrawal of large companies from the developing world such as Hydroquebec or Enron is 
providing an opportunity for the governments to get a sense of how to manage infrastructure 
as a public enterprise again and the feeling must be quite positive because many politicians 
consider that using the public services privatization experiences as a scapegoat for all 
government failures of the 1990s is a viable political position. The unhappiness of the 
electorate as users fuels the politicians’ formal change of heart, and the politicians’ zoom on 
this part of the reform agenda fuels the anti-privatization emotions of the users. The 
documented corruption among several  of the public administrators responsible for the 
reforms ease the politicians’ case for a change in government relying on a promise that the 
PPPI couples will not be maintained at the expense of users and taxpayers. As the paper has 
shown, facts reveal a much more complex reality but these facts do not seem to drive the 
political agenda on this specific topic.  Some policies are fads, many voters tend to have short 
memories (and high discount rates: they want it all right and right now) and counterfactuals 
are hard to establish (would things have been better if the public sector had continued to be in 
charge?).
18 
  In sum, as of the end of 2004, the coalition of the supporters of a continuation of the 
relationship seems to be dominated by the bankers, some of the operators and mostly non-
residential users. The coalition of the supporters of a divorce is led by  politicians and NGOs 
and supported by unions, taxpayers, residential users and includes some of the operators 
dissatisfied with the experience so far. Most of these actors have a fair claim for their position 
but there is no clear cut case for one or the other position. Multilaterals tend to have a much 
more pragmatic view of PPPI. Too many effectiveness criteria are in the balance and the 
optimal choice will differ across sectors and across regions to be able to get a straight answer. 
Ultimately it has to be a matter of preference by the voting majorities but these majorities 
                                                 
18 A more cynical interpretation of the political changes of heart may be that the privatization cow has been 
milked as much as possible and it is time to move on to the next cow.     17
need to be provided with a fair knowledge of the trade-off between fiscal, efficiency, equity 
and governance goals and need to have a clear sense of how these trade-off evolve from the 
short to the long run. If the commitment to transparency and education on the reforms of the 
1990s is an indication of things to come, the chances are that the voters and opinion makers 
will remain insufficiently informed. 
 
7. Concluding comments 
 
  Whether countries want to pursue the PPI experience or try something else, the 1990s 
have provided a number of useful lessons of relevance when considering the alternatives to 
PPI.   
  First, ignoring distributional weights, the reforms of the 1990s have generated relatively 
well documented welfare gains in most sectors as compared to the pre-reform situation. Any 
alternative policy will have to be able to add to or improve upon these welfare gains (defined 
in terms of efficiency). 
  Second, considering distributional effects, the evidence suggests that, in many countries 
and sectors—although not all-- reforms failed many of the poorest, ignoring them in the short 
run, or failing to rely on instruments that could deliver both efficiency and equity 
improvements in comparison to what prevailed before the reforms.  This need not be so. It 
should be easy to improve on the poverty payoff of PPPI but it is likely to come at a fiscal 
cost or will require some degree of cross-subsidization. 
  Third, the public sector is likely to continue to be a major actor in the sector as provider, 
as financier, but also as regulator; governments and politicians seem to be quite aware of the 
importance of the first two roles but much less aware, or much less keen, on the regulatory 
role. Yet regulation is how the incentive to ensure service delivery at lowest cost is built in 
reforms and how the cost savings from the incentives are shared with the users. Whatever the 
new arrangements, regulation will have to be done much more effectively and fairly than the 
reformers of the 1990s managed to do. Effective regulation requires effective regulatory tools 
and effective skills. The adoption of these tools and skills depends on the commitment of the 
politicians as well as on the recognition of its importance by the international community—
and this includes multilateral as well as bilateral donors--providing technical assistance for the 
implementation of the reforms.  
  Fourth, there are many ways of splitting the responsibilities between the public and the 
private partners. A lot of the emphasis has been on the investment side  but there are plenty of 
opportunities to also get the private sector to take responsibility for minimizing the operation 
and maintenance cost even if it is not interested in taking on any investments risks. 
  Fifth, the sector is very sensitive to the macroeconomic shocks that drive demand as 
well as the cost of the sector. The reforms of the 1990s have not been very effective at 
addressing exchange rates shocks or more general financial market shocks. The next wave of 
reforms needs to address the weaknesses of the capital markets and demand shocks much 
more explicitly. 
  Sixth, corruption continues to be a plague in the sector and the only way out is a much 
stronger commitment to transparency in the transactions with the private sector but also the   18
transactions within the public sector. The unwillingness of many public and private actors to 
generate the basic policy relevant information in sectors catering to some of the most basic 
needs of the poorest populations of the poorest countries of the world and in which 
monopolies— and hence unilateral control of socially relevant information--tend to prevail is 
simply outrageous. The adoption of  new international accounting standards scheduled for 
2006 should address this need increased transparency but it will require a commitment of the 
international community to their strict enforcement in developing countries by all operators, 
local as well as foreign. In an ideal world, it would also lead to the adoption of decent 
regulatory accounting principles for regulated infrastructure services. 
  Ultimately, the internalization of these lessons will generate the accountability needed to 
get good weddings going and bad flirts abandoned. How many of the good flirts end up in 
weddings and how many in divorces will depend on how well these lessons are internalized. 




Benitez, D., O. Chisari and A. Estache (2003), “Can the gains from Argentina’s utilities 
reform offset credit shocks?”, in Ugaz, C. and C. Waddams Price, ed.,  
 
Briceno, C., A. Estache and N. Shafik (2004), “Infrastructure Services In Developing 
Countries: Access, Quality, Costs and Policy Reform”, The World Bank, (forthcoming) 
 
Calderon, C. W. Easterly and L. Serven. (2003). “Infrastructure Compression and Public 
Sector Solvency in Latin America”, in Easterly, W. and L. Serven. 
 
Campos, J.,  A. Estache, N. Martin and L. Trujillo. (2003).  “Macroeconomic Effects of 
Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure”, in  Easterly, W. and L. Serven,  
 
Chisari, O., A. Estache and C. Romero (1999) “Winners and Losers from the Privatization 
and Regulation of Utilities: Lessons from a General Equilibrium Model of Argentina”, 
The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 13, No 2., pp. 357-378 
 
Chong, Alberto and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes. 2003. “The Truth about Privatization in 
Latin America”, Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper, October 
 
Coelli, T., A. Estache, S. Perelman and L. Trujillo (2003), A Primer on Efficiency 
Measurement for Utilities and Transport Regulators, World Bank Institute 
Publications,  Studies in Development Series  
 
Collignon, B and M. Vezina (2000), Independent Water and Sanitation Providers in 
African Cities: Full Report of a Ten-Country Study, Water and Sanitation Program. 
UNDP-World Bank. April 2000. 
DFID (2002), “Making connections: infrastructure for poverty reduction”, mimeo, available at 
http://62.189.42.51/DFIDstage/FOI/dc/7mar02_making_connections.pdf 
   19
Easterly, W. and L. Serven., editors,  (2003), The Limits of Stabilization: Infrastructure, 
Public Deficits and Growth in Latin America, Stanford University Press 
 
Estache, A. (2004),  “Utilities reform in Africa: efficiency vs. equity of performance 
outcomes”, mimeo, The World Bank 
 
Estache, A. and K. Gassner (2004), “Recent Economic Development in Energy and Water in 
Eastern Europe”,  mimeo, The World Bank. 
 
Estache, A. , A. Goicoechea and M. Manacorda (2004), ‘The access, quality and price 
outcomes of telecoms reform and governance”, mimeo, The World Bank 
 
Estache, A. and M.E. Pinglo (2004), “What happened to the private sector returns in 
developing countries since the Asian crisis?”, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper, No3373 
 
Estache, A.  and M. Rossi (2004), “Do Regulation and Ownership Drive the Efficiency of 
Electricity Distribution? Evidence from Latin America",  Economic Letters, 
(forthcoming) 
 
Estache, A. and T. Serebrisky (2004), Where Do We Stand on Transport Infrastructure 
Deregulation and Public-Private Partnership?”, World Bank Policy Research Working 
paper No. 3356 
 
Estache, A, V. Foster, and Q. Wodon (2002)  Accounting for Poverty in Infrastructure 
Reform. Washington, D.C. The World Bank Institute of Development Studies  
 
Estache, A. and M. Rossi. (2002) “How different is the efficiency of Public and Private 
Water Companies in Asia”, The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 16,  No1, 
139-148 
 
Guasch, Jose-Luis. (2004) Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions. 
Washington, D.C., The World Bank Institute of Development Studies. 
 
Kessides, I. (2004), Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation and Competition, 
Washington, D.C., World Bank, Policy Research Report Series 
 
McKenzie, David and Dilip Mookherjee. (2003).  “Distributive Impact of Privatization in 
Latin America:  An Overview of Evidence from Four Countries.”  Economia, vol. 3, no. 
2, Spring, pp. 161-218.  
 
Nellis, J. and N. Birdsall, N. (forthcoming in 2004), Glass Half Full: Assessing the 
Distributional Impact of Privatization, The Center for Global Development, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
Stern, J. and J. Cubbin (2003), Regulatory effectiveness: The impact of regulation and 
regulatory governance arrangements on electricity industry outcomes: a review paper”, 
mimeo, London Business School, Regulation Imitative Series, December   20
 
Stern, J.  and S. Holder (1999), “Regulatory Governance: Criteria for assessing the 
performance of regulatory systems: an application to infrastructure industries in the 
developing countries of Asia”, Utilities Policy, Vol. 8, pp33-50 
 
Ugaz, C. and C. Waddams Price (2003), Utility Privatization and Regulation: A Fair Deal 
for Consumers?” Edward Elgar,  Northampton, MA, USA. 
 
United Nations. (1999), “Privatization in Latin America in the Early 1990s”, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/17 
 
Wallsten, S. (2004), “Of carts and horses: Regulation and Privatization in 
Telecommunications Reforms”,  Journal of  Policy Reform 
 
Wallsten, S. (1999)  “An Empirical Analysis of Competition, Privatization and Regulation in 
Africa and Latin America.”  Washington, D.C.  World Bank Working Paper, WPS 2136.  
 
World Bank (2004),  World Development Report (Investment Climate), Washington, D.C.  
 
World Bank (1994), World Development Report (Infrastructure), Washington, D.C. 
 